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Orientation: The article discusses the relationship between enterprise risk management 
(ERM) and firm value.
Research purpose: The purpose of the study is to empirically examine the relationship 
between ERM and firm value. The study is undertaken within the context of the Chinese 
insurance industry. 
Motivation for the study: Recent attempts to link ERM with firm value have been undertaken 
primarily in the USA and Europe and have produced ambiguous and inconclusive findings. 
Research design, approach and method: Data was obtained from the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission, a government body responsible for regulating insurance products 
and services in China. The data sample consisted of 135 insurance companies operating in 
China (in 2010). Regression modelling is employed to analyse the data.
Main findings: The results show the relationship between ERM and firm value at first appears 
statistically significant within a Pearson correlation matrix but then falls below statistical 
significance on closer scrutiny through regression analysis. Accordingly, it is recommended 
that insurers in China should not look to aggressive investment in ERM as a strategy for 
producing quick gains in firm value.
Practical/managerial implications: Risk managers should plan ERM development from a risk 
management maturity perspective, which equates the highest level of ERM development with 
ERM’s capacity to improve firm resilience to the unknown and serve as a mechanism for 
strategic decision-making. 
Contribution/value-add: The study employed return on equity as a proxy for firm value, 
utilising ordinary least squares regression modelling to test propositions of the relationships 
between variables.
Introduction
This article is concerned with enterprise risk management (ERM) and its relationship to firm value. 
Recent attempts to link the two (e.g. Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011; McShane, Nair & Rustambekov 
2011) have been undertaken primarily in the USA and Europe. These have produced ambiguous 
and inconclusive findings. The main lesson learned has been that further studies such as the 
present one need to set ERM beside a range of further variables so that its links to firm value can 
emerge more clearly.
In China, ERM programmes are now becoming commonplace, especially within the fast-developing 
insurance industry. In 2009, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), which is 
charged by the government to regulate insurance products and services, announced guidelines 
for ERM implementation within the Chinese life insurance market. These announcements were 
followed in 2012 by the publication of a framework for assessing ERM implementation amongst 
insurers more generally. In view of the fact that the Chinese insurance industry currently stands 
at a crucial moment in its development, we deemed it appropriate for our study to explore how 
ERM can help the industry. Our article begins with a brief theoretical exploration intended to 
support our empirical research, which we undertook to ascertain whether there is an emerging 
statistical relationship between ERM and firm value within the Chinese insurance industry.  In 
the conclusion we emphasise that although a weak statistical relationship seems to exist, which 
may strengthen in future years as systems of ERM increasingly have their mettle tested, what 
may matter far more at present are the often subtle and not easily measurable ways in which 
firms can benefit from ERM. In the long run, all such benefits ought to be reflected together 
in any statistical relationships that are found to exist between ERM and firm value. Yet now, 
as the Chinese insurance industry liberalises in its asset management activities and moves to 
attract more global investment capital against a backdrop of rapidly evolving and sometimes 
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unpredictable CIRC regulation, what matters is to establish 
just how ERM can add value across the firm – and indeed 
beyond the boundaries of the firm. The answers to this 
question are potentially many, and they must be considered 
very carefully if investments in ERM aimed at adding firm 
value are to be targeted efficiently.
Literature review
What is enterprise risk management?
Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a risk management 
philosophy that emphasises a strategic and integrated 
approach to managing risk (Liebenberg & Hoyt 2003) and 
the many uncertainties from which risks emerge (Baxter et 
al. 2012). As Pagach and Warr (2011) illustrate, the primary 
objective of ERM is sometimes considered to be to lower 
the chances of firms experiencing substantial negative cash 
flows. This is generally achieved by taking a holistic approach 
to risk management, which reduces the chance that a firm 
will experience multiple negative events in its operations 
simultaneously. This concern with holism is emphasised by 
theorists (Baxter et al. 2012; Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011; Kaplan 
& Mikes 2012; McShane et al. 2011) who differentiate ERM 
from ‘silo-based’ forms of corporate risk management. Whilst 
this view of ERM as a system that can help firms withstand 
the effects of multiple simultaneous losses (e.g. large claims 
bursts arising across multiple lines of insurance business 
arising from ‘fundamental’ risk events) clearly has value, it 
does arguably tend to suffer from an unhelpfully reductive 
view of risk as ‘threat’, which is the hallmark of new and 
relatively undeveloped systems of risk management.  
Best practice guidance around the world has, for several years 
now, striven to overturn this reductionist understanding 
by insisting that risk management can usefully comprise 
the management of both threat and opportunity (Ward 
2005:39). We see this idea reflected in representations of ERM 
emphasising its concern to align strategic and operational 
decision-making capabilities to firm ‘risk appetite’ (Nocco 
& Stulz 2006). Recent guidance produced by the Institute 
of Risk Management (IRM) emphasises that risk appetite is 
an intrinsically complex concept whose meaning is likely to 
vary across organisations; yet, it possesses this core meaning:
Most animals, including human beings, have a ‘fight or flight’ 
response to risk. In humans this can be over-ruled by our 
cognitive processes. Our interpretation of risk appetite is that 
it represents a corporate vision of exactly the same instincts 
and cognitive processes. However, since these instincts are not 
‘hardwired’ in our corporate ‘nervous and sensory’ systems we 
use risk management as a surrogate. (IRM 2011:15)
This rich ‘corporations as individual persons’ metaphor 
perhaps transports us faster to understanding ERM than does 
any other theoretical approach. On this view, risk information 
should flow through a system of ERM to the ‘corporate brain’ 
just as pleasure and gain signals flow through the human 
nervous system to the human brain. In both cases, the brain 
can then decide whether to discontinue or to do more or less 
of the activities that produce these signals. What matters 
about ERM here is that it is essentially a strategic tool used to 
vary the firm’s direction and objectives as it moves through 
its forever-shifting risk environment and this is what makes 
it ‘more than’ a system of internal controls that operates 
against preselected and unvarying objectives. Hence, within 
fully fledged systems of ERM, strategic objective setting 
simply becomes part of the cyclical risk management process 
(COSO 2004). 
As a holistic undertaking, drawing on all the organisation’s 
resources to facilitate strategic change, ERM has sought to 
coordinate and by implication control (see Shleifer & Vishny 
1986), the entire risk management portfolio, covering diverse 
functions such as auditing, human resources management 
and information systems. Such coordinating activities aspire 
to produce understandings of interrelationships between 
all risks within the firm, and to categorise these effectively 
within risk registers to be used as touchstones for strategic 
decision-making. Some discussions of ERM (Barney 1991; 
Quon, Zeghal & Maingot 2012; Schrand & Unal 1998) 
view this coordinated overview of firm risk as a potential 
source of competitive advantage, particularly in uncertain 
market conditions. Where such coordinated overviews are 
achieved, and risk becomes visible holistically at ‘portfolio 
level’, problems of ‘cross-cutting’ risks can be addressed 
and the risks associated with an individual portfolio on 
being aggregated may become less than the total sum of the 
individual risks (Carter, Rogers & Simkins 2006). 
Firm value
Firm value is an economic measure of a firm’s performance 
which reflects the worth of the entire business (Grossman 
& Stiglitz 1977; Sarma & Rao 1969). Firm value focuses on 
the entire capital structure of the firm, thus allowing for its 
use in undertaking comparisons between firms of different 
structures of capital (Quiry et al. 2011). Hence, on the 
assumption that maximizing firm value represents a viable 
objective of many firms (Sundaram & Inkpen 2004), the 
effectiveness of an ERM initiative within a firm may be based 
on an assessment of its capability to raise firm value against 
market competition.
The ability of ERM to enhance firm value may also be explained 
by drawing upon theories of institutional ownership that 
seek to articulate the relationship between firm performance 
and the structure of its ownerships. More recently articulated 
by scholars such as Chung and Zhang (2011) and Cheng, 
Elyasiani and Jia (2011), the theory of institutional ownership 
posits an inverse relationship between the level of stability 
or diffuseness of firm ownership and its performance. 
Expanded to risk taking, Cheng et al. found that stable 
institutional ownership was often associated with lower risk-
taking. Such findings become particularly important from a 
Chinese insurer perspective when we consider the outlook 
for increasing volatility in patterns of ownership over the next 
few years. The thrust of new CIRC regulation throughout 2012 
has been to encourage private capital investment (the 15 June 
Implementation Opinions directive) whilst curbing the powers 
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of controlling shareholders (the 01 October Administrative 
Measures on Controlling Shareholders of Insurers directive). 
We posit, based on earlier studies by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), that firm ownership remains an important element in 
management control (and, by implication, coordination) and 
so it becomes important to consider how changing patterns 
of ownership may impact the risk coordination activities we 
referred to in the previous section.
Generally, the expectation is that firms in financial service 
industries are more likely to implement ERM (Beasley, 
Clune & Hermanson 2005; Beasley, Pagach & Warr 2008) 
and subsequently increase corporate governance and market 
efficiency due to increased oversight of managerial risk-
taking (Beasley et al. 2005, 2008; Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011). 
However, the precise nature of the relationship between 
ERM and firm value still remains inconclusive. For example, 
whilst Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) suggest a correlation 
between ERM and firm value (defined from the perspective 
of improvements to firm efficiency), other scholars such as 
Beasley et al. (2008) only found such relationships to exist in 
firms engaged in the financial services industry. McShane 
et al. (2011) found that ERM and firm value are positively 
related in firms with low or adequate ERM ratings. On 
the other hand, they found no significant evidence of this 
positive relationship in firms with strong or excellent ERM 
ratings.  Baxter et al. (2012) produced similar findings. Hoyt, 
Moore and Liebenberg (2006) and Gordon, Loeb and Tseng 
(2009) found ERM to have a positive impact on firm value; 
however, according to Gordon et al., the effects varied with 
firm size and complexity. A clearer cut finding is that of Hoyt 
et al. who found in a study of 125 publicly traded insurance 
firms in the United States that accrued ERM premium on firm 
value was approximately 17% of firm value. Taking stock of 
these mixed findings, the first proposition is put forward:
PR1: There is a positive relationship between ERM and firm 
value.
We decided to employ further variables related to firm value 
(and in various ways to ERM) within our study to facilitate 
a richer analysis of how ERM stands beside other factors as 
a creator of firm value. Earlier studies by Arena, Arnaboldi 
and Azzone (2010) and Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) suggest 
that control represents a critical antecedent of enterprise risk 
management. Within the context of ERM, ‘control’ is a means 
of ensuring that firm value is created by enhancing the firm’s 
capability in managing outcomes that are unexpected (Turner 
& Makhija 2006). Thus, whilst firms may adopt ERM in order 
to ensure that threats and opportunities are identified and 
prioritised, the notion of ‘control’ covers assurance processes 
that grant some relatively impartial audit insight into ERM 
effectiveness. 
Another important variable seen to impact on the relationship 
between ERM and firm value is firm size. This variable is used 
often in industrial economics literatures (Rahaman 2011), but 
its importance as a differentiator between firms with ERM 
programmes is becoming clear from the recent turn in ERM 
survey literature to focus on preferences for ‘centralised’ 
versus ‘decentralised’ systems of ERM within larger firms. 
Each approach is viewed by risk managers as having 
strengths and weaknesses for coping with the interrelated 
challenges of managerial control, oversight and strategic 
agility that matter for larger firms in particular (Deloitte 
2012:5). Larger insurance companies obviously enjoy greater 
market power. Their greater underwriting capacity also 
allows them to retain more of the lucrative risks that would 
otherwise be transferred to reinsurance markets, and to 
grow their catastrophe and claims equalisations reserves as 
a precaution against large claims bursts; furthermore, their 
greater capacity for diversification grants them more leeway 
to vary resources across their lines of business to help them 
survive the vicissitudes of the various insurance cycles that 
turn differently for each line. Hence, it is no surprise that 
Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) found that larger insurance 
companies generally achieved higher returns on equity 
(ROE). Similarly, McShane and Cox (2009) found that larger 
life insurance firms had lower risk of bankruptcy. Following 
earlier studies by Beasley et al. (2008) and Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2011), this study proposes the natural logarithm 
of book value of equity as a proxy for firm size, and therefore 
presents the second proposition:
PR2: There is a positive relationship between firm size and firm 
value.
Leverage is a further important firm variable; it refers to the 
extent of taking debt to acquire additional assets (Cheng, Liu 
& Chien 2010; Pagach & Warr 2011). Firms utilise debt to 
finance their businesses because this can reduce investments 
of free cash flow into suboptimal projects by self-interested 
managers (Jensen 1986). Also, taking on debt can lower 
a firm’s tax burden (MacKie-Mason 1990). That is to say, 
financial leverage can increase firm value. Moreover, at higher 
levels of firm leverage lenders may become increasingly 
likely to insist that firms develop ERM (and by the same 
token corporate governance and risk management more 
generally) to help de-risk their investments. Lenders are 
likely to grow particularly concerned when a firm’s debt 
becomes considerably higher than its assets. In such cases the 
excessive leverage will increase the probability of financial 
distress, thus leading the firm towards bankruptcy (Myers 
1977). Remaining mindful of these issues around leverage, 
this study uses book value of liability divided by book value 
of equity as a proxy for leverage (Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011; 
Tahir & Razali 2011), and proposes the third proposition:
PR3:  There is a positive relationship between leverage and firm 
value.
Studies (e.g. Myers 1977) have also shown sales growth as being 
another variable that can impact firm value. ERM’s influence, 
relative to that of sales growth, upon firm value is of interest 
in view of the fact that aggressive and unsustainable sales 
growth by financial institutions prior to the global financial 
crisis is popularly viewed as a cultural problem that systems 
of risk management failed to address. Nonetheless, this 
study proposes, based on earlier studies by Maury (2006) and 
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King and Santor (2008), that sales growth is likely to have 
a positive relationship with firm performance, and therefore 
presents the fourth proposition:
PR4: There is a positive relationship between sales growth and 
firm value.
Another variable of interest is ownership, which has been 
shown in literature (see Thomsen & Pedersen 1996), to be 
associated with two dimensions of meaning. The first one is 
the concentration ownership, which focuses on the majority 
ownership of a firm’s shares. Chen, Blenman and  Chen (2008) 
found in their empirical study that institutional ownership is 
positively related to firm value. The other dimension is the 
legal status that regulates the ownership. 
Some correlation between firm ownership and firm value 
appears to exist (Chen 2013; Pant & Pattanayak 2007). 
Particularly relevant to our study is Wei, Xie and Zhang’s 
(2005) exploration of the relationship between firm 
ownership and firm value in China. In their study spanning 
between 1991 and 2001, Wei et al. examined over 5000 firms, 
finding that those with the state as a majority stake-owner 
generally exhibited lower value whilst those with majority 
or total foreign ownership exhibited positive firm value. To 
control for the differences, this study uses a dummy variable 
to differentiate insurers with Chinese ownership from those 
with joint and foreign ownership, and proposes:
PR5: There is a positive relationship between joint or foreign 
ownership and firm value.
We also considered that the greater volatility of general as 
opposed to life insurance entails that ERM may play more 
significant value protective or creation roles for general 
insurers than for life insurers. In other words, at least for 
firms where ERM has made a contribution to firm value, we 
may well find general rather than life insurance clustering 
around these cases. To allow such effects to emerge from 
the analysis, a dummy variable was entered into the mix 
proposing that:
PR6: There is a negative relationship between life insurer and 
firm value.
In summary, all of the ambiguity arising from the extant 
literature linking ERM to firm value provides our rationale 
for undertaking the present study. Our research now 
undertook to explore this link with reference to a good range 
of variables, each of which were considered to perhaps play 
important and possibly sometimes subtly interrelated roles 
in the creation of firm value. 
Research methodology
Measuring firm value
Although associated with a number of limitations (see 
Dybvig & Warachka 2012), it is common practice for scholars 
(e.g. Smirlock, Gilligan & Marshall 1984; Smithson & Simkins 
2005; Wernerfelt & Montgomery 1988) to employ Tobin’s 
Q (Tobin 1969) as a proxy for firm value. Tobin’s Q is a 
ratio that compares a firm’s market value of assets to their 
replacement cost. That is to say, Tobin’s Q can only be used 
for publicly traded firms, because it requires the assets’ value 
in the market. However, this present study focuses on the 
whole of China’s insurance industry, in which the majority 
of insurers are unlisted firms. Thus instead return on equity 
(ROE), which refers to the return on portfolios, is employed. 
Studies by Wang (2013), for example, suggest that under 
linear homogeneity assumptions, there is a direct correlation 
between firm value (measured as the performance of a new 
investment portfolio) and ROE. Based on this, ROE has been 
employed by earlier scholars such as Chen et al. (2008) and 
Nieh, Yau and Liu (2008) as a measure of firm value. 
Framework for data analysis
To test the propositions we employed ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression modelling, a technique frequently employed 
in studies focused on testing relationships between variables. 
Ordinary least squares regression modelling has been 
employed in a number of studies, such as Beasley et al. (2008) 
and Gordon et al. (2009), which have sought to examine 
determinant factor effect on firm value. 
In statistics, OLS regression is utilised to estimate unknown 
parameters within a linear regression model (Balestra 1970; 
Haggstrom 1983). This method involves minimising the sum 
of squared residuals, in other words the vertical distance 
between the actual and estimated positions of the dependent 
variable (Stone & Brooks 1990), with the resultant estimator 
being expressed using a simple mathematical formula (Shao 
1990). Based on the variables and proposed relationships 
articulated in the previous chapter, the following regression 
model is proposed for testing the proposed relationships 
between ERM and firm value:
ROE = β0 + β1ERM + β2SIZE + β3LEV + β4SG + 
β5OWN + β6LIFE + ε…..                        [Eqn 1]
Where:
ROE is the proxy for firm value, defined as net income divided 
by book value of equity.
ERM is a dummy variable, set equal to 1 for insurers with ERM, 
and 0 otherwise. The expected sign of ERM is positive.
SIZE is the measure of firm size, defined as the natural logarithm 
of book value of equity. The expected sign of SIZE is positive.
LEV is the measure of leverage, defined as book value of liability 
divided by book value of equity. The expected sign of LEV is 
positive.
SG is the proxy for growth opportunities; it is sales growth, 
defined as the difference between sales of 2010 and sales of 2009 
divided by sales of 2009. The expected sign of SG is positive.
OWN is a dummy variable, with the value of 1 for Chinese-
owned insurers, and 0 otherwise. The expected sign of OWN is 
negative.
LIFE is a dummy variable, which is assigned 1 for life insurance 
companies and 0 otherwise. The expected sign of LIFE is 
negative.
ε is the error item, also known as the residual.
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In the regression model (shown in Equation 1), ROE is a 
dependent variable, whilst ERM is an independent variable. 
The remaining independent variables are control variables, 
which are employed to control the association with firm 
value (and thus help to explain the relationship between 
ERM and firm value). The data was obtained from CIRC’s 
records. Data analysis involved running the linear regression 
analysis function in SPSS.
Sample and descriptive statistics
The initial sample was drawn from the entire population 
of insurers operating in China in 2010. This comprised 135 
insurance companies (obtained from CIRC’s records). In 
terms of the datasets, we focused on data showing ‘sales in 
2009’, ‘book value of liability’, ‘book value of equity’, ‘sales in 
2010’, ‘net income’, ‘firm deals in life insurance products’ and 
‘firm ownership is Chinese-dominant’. Of the 135 firms listed 
on CIRC’s database, 16 were eliminated because of missing 
data, thus leaving the final sample comprising 119 insurance 
firms. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2006), to test for 
individual regression coefficients, the sample size should be 
larger than 103 plus the number of independent variables, 
whilst to undertake R-square tests, the sample size should be 
no less than 50 plus eight times the number of independent 
variables. These therefore imply that a sample size of 119 
insurers employed in this study is reliable.
A breakdown of the firms shows 55 being life insurers and 
64 being non-life insurers. In terms of ownership, 66 were 
wholly Chinese-owned firms whilst the remaining 53 were 
either foreign owned or jointly owned with foreign firms. 
Twenty-five of the firms indicated wholesale adoption of 
ERM. Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation for 
each variable used in this study.
The correlation matrix shown in Table 2 gives an overview of 
the bivariate relationships between variables. The correlations 
can, heeding earlier work by Tabachnick and Fidell (2006), be 
perceived as independent from the multivariable regression 
model. It can be observed from the r matrix that ERM and 
three control variables are associated with firm value (ROE), 
although the correlations are weak. Also, the correlations 
between ERM and other independent variables are not large 
(≤ 0.7), thus indicating that the problem of selectivity bias 
may not necessarily be of major concern. Moreover, as no 
variables show strong correlations, all are retained during 
OLS regression modelling for further analysis.
In Table 3, we show the summary of independent variables 
with proposed effects on ROE. The independent variable 
ROE is the proxy for firm value. 
Table 4 represents the assessment of the regression model 
(equation 1) adopted in this study. For multivariable 
regression, adjusted R-square should be more reliable 
than R-square, since the former adjusted the number of 
independent variables and sample size (see Tabachnick & 
Fidell 2006). This model’s adjusted R-square is 0.231, implying 
that a 23% variance in ROE is explainable by independent 
variables within the model. Additionally, the significance 
level of F value being less than 1% confirms that the model is 
statistically significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic (Durbin 
& Watson 1950, 1951) is employed to test the autocorrelation 
of residuals. The rationale for this test is that if autocorrelation 
exists, the regression model will not be applicable. With the 
numbers of insurers and independent variables, referring 
to the critical values for the Durbin-Watson test, Savin and 
White (1997) found that a Durbin-Watson value of 1.963 
indicates the independence of residuals. Therefore, the 
analysis of adjusted R-square, significance of F and Durbin-
Watson statistic confirms that the regression model’s 
goodness-of-fit is acceptable.
Coefficients, correlations and collinearity 
statistics
Each coefficient (denoted by the β values, as shown in Table 5) 
represents the extent to which a dependent variable will 
1.In our calculations, we acknowledge that the R-square value is low but argue that 
this means the independent variables do substantively influence the variance of the 
dependent. We took this position because we did not come across any evidence, 
theoretical or empirical, to indicate that any important variables were missing from 
the model.
TABLE 1: Mean and standard deviation for each variable.
Variable description Variable 
name
Mean Standard 
deviation
Firm value ROE -0.00005 0.26608
Enterprise risk management ERM 0.21008 0.40909
Firm size SIZE 6.98058 1.60523
Leverage LEV 6.29303 7.54453
Sales growth SG 1.25755 3.54942
Chinese ownership OWN 0.54462 0.49911
Life insurance LIFE 0.46218 0.50068
N = 119.
TABLE 2: Pearson correlation matrix.
Variable name ROE ERM SIZE LEV SG OWN LIFE
ROE 1.000 - - - - - -
ERM 0.245** 1.000 - - - - -
SIZE 0.355** 0.503** 1.000 - - - -
LEV 0.365** 0.190* 0.247** 1.000 - - -
SG -0.113 -0.108 -0.069 -0.185* 1.000 - -
OWN 0.253** 0.213** 0.532** 0.182* 0.057 1.000 -
LIFE -0.141 -0.106 0.066 0.271** -0.079 -0.153* 1.000
ERM, Enterprise risk management; LEV, Leverage; LIFE, Life insurer; OWN, Chinese ownership; ROE, Return on equity; SG, Sales growth; SIZE, Firm size.
*, Significance level of 5%.
**, Significance level of 1%.
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change following the changes of an independent variable 
whilst other independent variables are held constant. For 
example, the β of SIZE is 0.046, which implies ROE is expected 
to increase by 0.046 if SIZE increases one unit and other 
variables are held constant. The significance of coefficients 
is assessed by a t-test. It can be seen from the Table 5 that 
ERM does not have statistically significant relationship 
with firm value ROE, and neither do sales growth SG and 
Chinese ownership OWN. On the other hand, firm size SIZE 
and leverage LEV are positively related to ROE at 5% and 
1% significance levels respectively, whilst life insurance 
LIFE is negatively related to ROE at 1% significance level. 
Nevertheless, their relationships with ROE are fairly weak.
In the correlations column, the bivariate correlations between 
ROE and independent variables were represented by zero-
order, whereas the partial shows the correlations after 
controlling for all other independent variables. It can be seen 
that LEV has the highest positive correlation with ROE, whilst 
LIFE has the most negative correlation with ROE. Generally, 
collinearity tests are employed when testing whether at 
least one independent variable is highly correlated with a 
combination of other independent variables. As shown in 
Table 5, the variance inflationary factor (VIF) had no value 
lager than 10, which, based on earlier work by Belsley, Kuh 
and Welsch (1980), indicates that a multi-collinearity problem 
does not exist in this study.
In sum, from Figure 1a, the residuals are observed to be 
normally distributed. In the scatterplot graph (Figure 1b), 
there appears no discernable pattern, which indicates the 
homogeneity of variance and supports the linearity of 
variables, thus indicating that the validity of the data is high. 
Findings
A review of the outcomes from the data analysis shows that 
in terms of the first proposition (PR1: There is a positive 
relationship between ERM and firm value), it can be found in 
the model assessment (Table 4) and table showing coefficients, 
correlations and collinearity statistics (Table 5) that ERM was 
positively correlated to firm value, although not significantly 
− and certainly not with sufficient magnitude to legitimate 
strong claims concerning ERM’s potential to add value 
within China’s insurance industry. This ambiguous finding 
for PR1 may be construed as in line with earlier studies. 
Previous literature (Gordon et al. 2009; Hoyt & Liebenberg 
2011; McShane et al. 2011; Tahir & Razali 2011) appears 
to indicate two conflicting perceptions of ERM’s ability 
to create value for firms. Stronger positive claims come 
from studies by Nocco and Stulz (2006), Shamieh (2007) 
and Zaccanti (2009). For example whilst Nocco and Stulz 
found ERM enhancing firm value through better risk-based 
allocation of resources, Shamieh saw ERM as being able to 
enhance firm value through all it does to achieve solvency 
regulation compliance. Counter claims of zero or negative 
impact on firm value come from studies such as Roll (1986) 
who draws attention to the high costs associated with ERM 
adoption.  Furthermore, Lin, Wen and Yu (2012) argue that 
a major contributing factor to the failure of ERM adoption 
resides with managers underestimating costs associated with 
not only initiating, but also maintaining ERM initiatives. 
Taking stock of these mixed views, we considered it 
inappropriate to read much into our weak statistical 
generalisations, and instead chose to rely heavily on more 
detailed findings emerging from OLS regression. A review 
of prior studies by Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) suggested 
the possibility of employing the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
selection correction model (see Puhani 2000). Hoyt and 
Liebenberg employed this model to explore drivers for ERM, 
which involved employing a probit regression model to 
explain the relationships between ERM and its determinants 
prior to using an OLS regression model to then examine the 
effect of independent variables on firm value. However, in 
TABLE 3: Summary of independent variables.
Independent 
variable
Proposed effect on 
return on equity
Definition
ERM + Dummy variable: 1 = insurers with 
enterprise risk management, 0 otherwise
SIZE + Firm size = Ln (book value of equity)
LEV + Leverage = book value of liability / book 
value of equity
SG + Sales growth = (sales of 2010 – sales of 
2009) / sales of 2009
OWN - Dummy variable: 1 = insurers with 
Chinese ownership, 0 otherwise
LIFE - Dummy variable: 1 = life insurer, 0 
otherwise
TABLE 5: Coefficients, correlations and collinearity statistics.
Variable name Unstandardised Coefficients t Significance Correlations Collinearity statistics
Β Standard error Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance Variance inflationary 
factor
(Constant) -0.332 0.111 -3.005 0.003 - - - - -
ERM 0.003 0.063 0.049 0.961 0.245 0.005 0.004 0.700 1.429
SIZE 0.046 0.018 2.479 0.015 0.355 0.228 0.200 0.523 1.911
LEV 0.013 0.003 3.999 0.000 0.365 0.353 0.322 0.819 1.220
SG -0.004 0.006 -0.579 0.564 -0.113 -0.055 -0.047 0.947 1.056
OWN 0.002 0.053 0.030 0.976 0.253 0.003 0.002 0.651 1.537
LIFE -0.137 0.047 -2.915 0.004 -0.141 -0.266 -0.235 0.829 1.206
Note: Dependent variable: ROE; predictors: (constant), LIFE, SIZE, SG, LEV, ERM, OWN.
TABLE 4: Model assessment.
R-square Adjusted 
R- square
F Significance Durbin-
Watson
0.272 0.233 6.960 < 0.001 1.963
Note: Dependent variable: ROE; predictors: (constant), LIFE, SIZE, SG, LEV, ERM, OWN.
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this study, considering that examining ERM’s determinants 
was not a research objective, probit regression modelling was 
not conducted. 
In terms of the second proposition (PR2: There is a positive 
relationship between firm size and firm value), the coefficient 
of SIZE in Table 5 shows firm size as being positively related 
to firm value at 5% significance level, thus confirming the 
second proposition. Our findings are in line with earlier 
studies. For example, Beasley et al. (2005) suggest that ERM 
adoption is largely determined by firm size.  Further evidence 
of this effect can be found in Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) 
and McShane and Cox (2009). Based on our findings we can 
concur that larger insurance firms in China generally seem to 
obtain higher returns on equity. 
In terms of the third proposition (PR3: There is a positive 
relationship between leverage and firm value), we found that 
the coefficient of LEV was positive and statistically significant, 
thus implying a significantly positive leverage against 
firm value; hence the acceptance of the third proposition. 
This finding is in line with those of Cheng et al. (2010) and 
Pagach and Warr (2011). These findings help to clarify the 
context within which ERM becomes valuable for firms. As 
Pagach and Warr suggest, when firms become increasingly 
levered, they become increasingly likely to commission ERM 
programmes to deal with increased volatility in earnings and 
stock performance. 
The fourth proposition of the study (PR4: There is a positive 
relationship between sales growth and firm value) was 
however rejected. Regression analysis showed that the 
coefficient of SG was not only negative but also insignificant. 
This finding was consistent with earlier studies, particularly 
McShane et al. (2011), who found a similar negative effect 
but at a significant level. These findings should remind us, 
perhaps, that for Chinese insurers as for many firms more 
generally more sales do not necessarily produce higher 
returns on firm equity. For insurers in particular, careful 
decisions often have to be taken to cap or wind down lines 
of business where profit margins are being squeezed or 
where insured risks are escalating. If systems of managerial 
incentives work well, then incentives to keep the sales engine 
fired up should reduce as underwriting capacity becomes 
exhausted and higher proportions of business must then be 
transferred to reinsurers. Careful regulation of sales growth 
may therefore sometimes serve as a proxy for the sort of well-
governed, prudent insurance firm that is most likely to make 
ERM a success, and which is also more likely to create value 
for shareholders.
In terms of the fifth proposition (PR5: There is a positive 
relationship between Chinese ownership and firm value), it 
was observed that the coefficient of OWN was positive (but 
not significant), thus suggesting that neither Chinese nor 
foreign ownership of insurance firms seems to enhance firm 
value. On this basis, we rejected the fifth proposition. 
Finally, for our sixth proposition (PR6: There is a negative 
relationship between life insurer and firm value), we 
observed a significant negative value for the coefficient 
of LIFE, which serves to underscore the likelihood that an 
important business context in which ERM can contribute to 
firm value is likely to be the – perhaps obvious – one in which 
ERM can help give insurers confidence to expose themselves 
to the more volatile and ‘quick win’ general insurance 
markets. 
Conclusion
Noting that empirical studies testing value-added hypotheses 
suggesting a relationship between ERM and firm value 
remained largely scarce, our study sought to empirically 
examine the relationship between ERM and firm value. 
This examination was undertaken within the context of the 
Chinese insurance industry, leading to the presentation of six 
propositions to be tested:
PR1: There is a positive relationship between ERM and firm 
value.
FIGURE 1: Normality, homogeneity and linearity: (a) Histogram and (b) scatterplot.
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PR2: There is a positive relationship between firm size and firm 
value.
PR3: There is a positive relationship between leverage and firm 
value.
PR4: There is a positive relationship between sales growth and 
firm value.
PR5: There is a positive relationship between joint or foreign 
ownership and firm value.
PR6: There is a negative relationship between life insurer and 
firm value.
We employed return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for firm value, 
utilising ordinary least squares (OLS) regression modelling 
to test propositions of the relationships between variables. 
Data was obtained from the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC), a government body responsible for 
regulating insurance products and services in China. The 
data sample consisted of 135 insurance companies operating 
in China (in 2010). In all, our findings were mixed. For 
example, whilst the test of our first proposition (PR1) was 
inconclusive, in terms of the second (PR2), third (PR3) and 
sixth propositions (PR6), significant positive relationships 
were found. On the other hand, in the case of the fourth 
(PR4) and fifth propositions (PR5), the likelihood of a real 
link was rejected. The results of the study were mixed, 
initially showing the relationship between ERM and Chinese 
ownership as significant, but on further examination, the 
correlation became less significant.
A critical question that emerges from this study is therefore 
whether the adoption of ERM could increase the objectivity 
and transparency of Chinese firms to the extent that ERM 
begins to enhance firm value. This question is extremely 
pertinent because, as earlier cited, according to arguments put 
forward by scholars such as Barney (1991), Quon et al. (2012), 
Schrand and Unal (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), risk 
when managed at an enterprise level does have the potential 
to add value to firm operations. As earlier indicated, ERM 
emphasises a strategic perspective of managing risk. Noting 
that earlier scholars such as Coase (1937) had pointed out 
that transactions are generally placed within a firm when 
the cost of business is lower than the cost of placing such 
business activities outside, ERM will be able to facilitate 
the creation of firm value through its ability to enhance the 
organisation’s ability to either reduce or eliminate lower-
end activities within the firm that are associated with high 
transaction costs. The main underlying theory supporting 
such positioning is transaction cost economics (TCE; see 
Chiles & McMackin 1996; Ghoshal & Moran 1996; Klaes 
2000), which utilises behavioural assumptions to predict how 
organisations make choices on their governance structures. 
The main ethos of TCE is that governance structures are 
primarily determined by an assessment of parties of asset 
specificity levels, how frequent different parties interact and 
the degree of risk surrounding such interactions. In effect, 
according to Grossman and Hart (1986:74), TCE posits that 
governance structures are a function of the attributes of 
transactions, therefore suggesting that ERM can create value 
by reducing the probability that a particular risk does impact 
adversely on the firm. Enterprise risk management can 
therefore enhance firm value to the extent that the adoption 
of ERM serves as a means of ensuring that firms do have 
sufficient internal control mechanisms that minimise their 
exposure to risk associated with engaging in innovative (and 
thereby risky) activities (see Marshall & Ojiako 2010).
There are of course challenges to the adoption of ERM by 
Chinese insurance firms. In the first place, whilst the majority 
of the firms sampled (by the nature of their business) were 
expected to operate risk management units, information 
on their expertise and robustness (quality) of their risk 
management processes remained largely unknown. In fact, 
recognising that the concept of risk remains to an extent 
vague (Fischhoff, Watson & Hope 1984; Hansson 1989, 1996), 
it remains to an extent possible that notions of ERM within the 
sample were diverse with different firms interpreting ERM 
differently and across a range of different organisational or 
competitive contexts. This situation provides an opportunity 
for future studies where extra care may be needed to first 
establish (perhaps via qualitative interviews) how potential 
respondents in a sample conceive the two concepts that 
formed the core of this study, ‘value’ and ‘ERM’, prior to 
sampling. Establishing respondent perception of the two 
concepts may also involve the utilisation of the analytic 
hierarchy process (AHP). In such scenarios, AHP is 
employed to examine and weight defining variables that are 
more closely associated with a specific target sample. The 
utilisation of OLS regression modelling to test relationships 
between variables also provides scholars with opportunities 
for future studies. More specifically, although the application 
of ROE and general regression modelling is a common 
practice in economic sciences research, most recent research 
shows a growing interest of researchers in implementation of 
complex approaches to such studies. As such, future studies 
may seek to employ the use of multidimensional methods 
of data analysis, such as analytic, artificial neural networks 
and other artificial intelligence methods for analysis, thus 
not only allowing for the simultaneous analysis of multiple 
measures of firm value and determinants that are likely to 
reflect the economic reality of Chinese insurance sector, but 
also addressing possible concerns relating to any doubts that 
direct implementation of Western-tested ERM systems can be 
successfully incorporated into Chinese managerial practices.
We therefore argue that a limitation within this study is that 
because the conceptualisation of ‘value’ and ‘ERM’ were pre-
set and did not emerge naturally from the sample, the potential 
richness of specific cultural considerations of ‘value’ and 
‘ERM’ were lost. Being that the study emphasised a Chinese 
context, possible studies in the future may be required to 
draw upon commonly employed firm value indexes that 
appears peculiar to emerging markets such as China or to 
extend the ‘lessons learnt’ to other emerging economies such 
as Brazil, South Africa, India and Nigeria in order to ensure 
that practical relevance to a wider management audience is 
maintained.
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